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The first  significant  changes in  the peanut  THE  PEANUT  PROGRAM
program in more than 20 years are contained in
the Food  and  Agricultural  Act  of  1977.  The  The  peanut  program  establishes  acreage
new program  retains the use of acreage  allot-  allotments,  marketing  quotas,  and  price  sup-
ments,  marketing  quotas,  and support  prices  ports.  Before  the  1977  Food  and Agriculture
but  changes  the  procedure  used  to establish  Act, peanut prices were supported at a level be-
the  size  of the  allotments  and  quotas  given.  tween 75 and 90 percent of parity.  Peanuts not
The  new  program  provides  for  two  support  sold for edible use at the established  support
prices versus one under the old program and no  price  level  were  acquired  by  the  Commodity
longer  relates  the  support  price  level  to  a  Credit  Corporation  (CCC)  through  a  nonre-
"parity price" concept.  course  loan  program.  Thus  the support  price
In anticipation of the changes expected to be  was maintained  for all peanuts marketed.  Be-
forthcoming  from  the  new  program  during  cause the quality of peanuts deteriorates as the
1978 and future years, an analysis  was under-  length of storage increases,  the CCC generally
taken to determine the effect of changing pea-  has  resold  its  acquired  stocks  in  the export
nut  marketing  quotas  and  support  prices  on  market  or  domestic  crushing  market  within
producer  income,  peanut  consumer  surplus,  the current crop year.
and peanut program costs.  The analysis  does 
not focus on changes generated by the new pro-  In the  past the minimum  national  acreage
gram because  specific aspects of the program  allotment  for  peanuts  has  been  1.6  million
were  not  known  when  the research  was  con-  acres. The marketing quotas granted generally
ducted. Rather, the effect of a change or combi-  havebeensuffcient  to  allow all peanuts  pro-
nation  of  changes  in  marketing  quotas  and  duced on the allotted acres to be sold. Slightly
a d in  a g  l m  more than half of all the peanuts produced and support prices is analyzed in a general manner. support pieisal.  e  . a gnrl  m  r  sold typically have been purchased-by the CCC Generalizations about the new program can be  p
made on the basis of the analysis.  for resale in the crush or export market  (Table
1).  The crush  price  for  peanuts  has been  ap-
proximately  equal  to  the  estimated  variable
THE  PEANUT  MARKET  cost  of  peanut  production.  Both  the  crush
market  price  and the direct  (variable)  cost of
Previous  studies  of  the  peanut  market  producing peanuts have been about one half to
centered on three forms of demand for peanuts:  two  thirds  of  the  support  price  for  peanuts;
edible demand,  crush  demand,  and export  de-  hence,  the  CCC  has encountered  considerable
mand [1,  3 -5,  7  - 9].  These  studies document  expense in its support operations.
that the demand for peanuts can be separated
into  two  distinct  markets,  an  edible  market  Under the new peanut program contained in
and a nonedible market consisting of crush and  the 1977 Food and Agricultural Act, price sup-
export  demand.  Empirical  results  of  these  ports will be continued and acreage  allotments
studies  show  that  nonedible  demand  is  are likely to remain unchanged.  However,  the
substantially  more  price  elastic  than  edible  new  program  does  not  require  the  support
demand for peanuts.'  price  to  fall  between  75  and  90  percent  of
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'The peanut demand studies reviewed  and cited here contained estimates of elasticities of demand for edible peanuts ranging from -.07 to -.44. Estimates of
elasticities of demand for peanuts to crush ranged from -2.74 to -26.3. Estimates of export elasticities are not numerous but range from -.97 to as high as -32.1.
99parity;  rather the support price for the period  ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK
1978-1981  will  remain  constant  at  approxi-
mately  21  cents per pound.  The  21  cent  sup-  An  acreage  control/price  support  system,
port price will be maintained only for a portion  such as the one which  forms the basis of the
of expected  total production,  i.e.  3,360 million  past  and  forthcoming  peanut  programs,  re-
pounds in 1978 or about 80 percent of expected  quires  consideration  of three controllable  fac-
potential  production  from  allotted  acres.  In  tors  in  policy  formulation:  (1) the  acreage
each  successive  year after  1978,  the quota  of  allotment and/or marketinggquota  level, (2) the
peanuts that will be supported at 21 cents per  support price level, and (3) the cost of the pro-
pounds will decline by 5  percent. A second but  gram. The procedure used to analyze the effect
lower support price,  taking into consideration  of changing any of these three policy variables
"the  demand  for peanut  oil  and peanut  meal,  consisted  of combining  a  nonlinear  optimiza-
expected prices of other vegetable oils and pro-  tion algorithm2 with a peanut demand models
tein meal, and the demand  for peanuts  in the  developed by Fleming and White^3
41 to form  a
foreign  market"  [10,  Sec.  108]  will  be main-  static  optimal  control  framework.  By use  of
tained for any peanuts produced in addition to  optimal control techniques, values for the con-
the quota.  Such peanuts are referred to in the  trollable policy variables were found which op-
act  as  "additional  peanuts."  The  1978  addi-  timized  alternative  objective  functions.  The
tional  peanut  support  price  is  12.5  cents  per  objective  functions used were  defined  so that
pound.  "targeted  conditions"  would  be  achieved
TABLE 1.  PEANUT PRODUCTION AND DEMAND DATA, 1970-75a
Estimated  Total  CCC  Losses
Peanut  Edible  Crushing  Direct  Cost  Support  Farm  and
Production  Demand  Crush  Export  Price  of  Production  Price  Revenue  Expenses
Year  (mil.  lbs.)  (mil.  lbs.)  (mil.  lbs.)  (mil.  lbs.)  (/lb.  .)  (¢/lb.  )  (1  x 7)/lb  (mil.  $)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
1977-  3,681  1,825  600  900  --  10.9-11.6  21.5  791.4 
b/  h,/ 1976-  3,751  1,800  1,108  783  -_  11.7  20.7  776.5 
1975  3,857  1,870  1,447-  435  d/  11.2  19.7  738.2  79.0
/
1974  3,668  1,800  596  740  -- /  8.9  18.3  671.2  3.0
1973  3,474  1,840  683  709  12.0  7.7
e /
16.4  569.7  5.0-
1972  3,275  1,694  850  521  8.8  6.9
/
1  14  .3  48  58.0
6.  5-!e/  13.4  402.7  975.0
1971  3,005  1,623  814  552  6.5  6.5
- /
13.4  402.7  97.
1970  2,979  1,580  799  290  6.6  6.3  12.8  381.3  66
aSources:  U.S. Department of Agriculture:  Fats and Oils Statistics.  Prices for crushing peanuts are  from USDA, ERS
unpublished sources. Estimated direct costs of production are from the ERS-USDA report to the Senate Agricultural Com-
mittee entitled "Cost of Producing Selecting Crops in the United States-1975,  1976, and Projections for 1977."
b19 76 values are preliminary. 1977 values are forecasted.
CThe  large increase  in peanut crushing  in 1975 and 1976 coincides  with "toll crushing"  activities. Toll crushing is an ar-
rangement  allowing crushers to crush government peanuts  and return the oil produced to the government but retain the
meal produced as payment for their crushing services.
dSince the origin of the "toll crush" program in 1974, crushing prices cannot be determined  in a comparable manner.
eBackward extrapolations  of 1974-76 USDA national average variable cost of production estimates were made on the basis
of Oklahoma peanut production budget data.
fAbnormally strong demand for peanut meal occurred in 1973 because of a shortage of high protein feeds. This demand re-
sulted in low government costs for the peanut program in 1973.
gNet  after reimbursements of $47  million from P.L.  480,  Title II  funds and exclusion of loss of  $10  million on  roasted
peanuts and peanut granules purchased.
hNot available.
'The optimization-control  procedure used is referred to as the "complex algorithm"  [21. Computer coding for the algorithm and a description of its use are pre-
sented by Kuester and Mize [61. The algorithm consists  of a systematic  search procedure capable of finding the control values which  maximize an objective function.
The search method used in the complex procedure is a specific modification of the procedure generally referred to as the "hill climbing"  method. The objective func-
tion describing the desired  performance  must be formed  from  output variables of the model  and  may be  nonlinear.  Nonlinear  constraints  may be placed on the
permissible control values. The model representing the system being controlled may be of any form desired.
'Fleming  and Whtie's publication and Fleming's thesis should be consulted for a full description of the model. As adopted for use here, it consists of eight equa-
tions and identities including demands for edible peanuts,  crushing demand,  export demand,  feed and  seed use, government purchases  and resales,  and  carryover
stock. Supply is exogenous to the model and is assumed to be determined by policy or in long-run equilibrium consistent with an assumed cost of production.
100rather than maximum values. That is, controls  depicting  combinations  of  marketing  quotas
were  sought  such  that  certain  farm  income  and support prices that would result in a given
levels,  consumer  surpluses,  etc.,  would be  ob-  farm income from peanut marketing are shown
tained rather than maximum  levels. This type  also. The isobudget lines were derived by use of
of  objective  function  makes  use  of  "penalty  optimal  control  procedures.  The  1975  market
values"  and  is  maximized  when  all  penalties  conditions were used to initialize all exogenous
have  been  reduced  to  zero.  Penalty  values  noncontrollable  variables.  By  targeting  the
generally are  calculated  as the squared  differ-  budget at a given level and restricting the per-
ence between the targeted value and the simu-  missible  control  value  for  support  price  at
lated value  resulting from a given  set  of con-  varying  levels,  optimal  control  procedures
trols. An example  of this type  of an objective  could  be  used  to  solve  for  the  associated
function  is  given  below.  A  negative  sign  is  marketing  quota  which  caused  the  targeted
given to the sum of the penalty values  so that  values of the objective function to be obtained.
maximization  instead of  minimization  can  be  The  solution  values  obtained  for  the  control
conducted.  variables  and the associated targeted budgets
U = -(NET +  BUDGET +  CLEAR)  and  permissible  support  prices  were  used  to
U  = value to be maximized  define isobudget lines.
NET  = a  penalty  value  forcing  net
farm income to obtain a target-  Isonet  farm  income  lines  were  obtained
ed value; net farm income is cal-  directly (without using optimal control proced-
culated  as  the  difference  be-  ures)  by multiplying  the marketing quota  by
tween  total  revenue  (sales  the  profit  margin  associated  with  a  given
times  support  price)  and  the  point. Profit margin is defined as the difference
direct  cost  of  production  (all  between the support price  and the direct  cost
costs  except  land  charges)  as  of production. The points of tangency between
calculated  by ERS-USDA  [11]  the  isobudget  lines  and  isonet  income  lines
and reported in Table  1.  indicate the quota and support price combina-
BUDGET = a penalty value forcing govern-  tions  that  maximize  net  farm  income  from
ment expenditures  to  be  equal  peanut  sales  under alternative  budget  levels
to a given budget;  government  and 1975 market conditions.
expenditures  are  calculated  as
support  price  minus  nonedible  Farm Income/Budget  Cost Tradeoffs
peanut price times the quantity
of  peanuts  resold  by  the  gov-  Figure 1 can be used to answer several policy
ernment,  plus  a  2.18  cent  a  tradeoff  questions.  A  vertical  line  drawn
pound  handling  charge  per  through any support price will indicate the net
pound resold.  income  and  program  costs  associated  with
CLEAR  = penalty value forcing  the mar-  alternative  quota  sizes  and  a  given  support
ket  to  clear,  i.e.  maintain  con-  price.  Likewise,  a  horizontal  line  drawn
stant carryover stock levels; it  through any quota  level  will  indicate  the net
is calculated as the squared dif-
ference  between carryin stocks  M0  0r—m0i  30t
and estimated carryout stocks.  4  ooo  000  3I  0 
By  alteration  of  the  targeted  values  desired 
and the restrictions placed  on the permissible  1,500  \  \  so-Budet  Le(Mln 
control  values  that can  be  used  to achieve  a  3000  \  Por  Givrnll de targeted  set  of  conditions,  the  solutions  ob-\\  \ 
tained for the policy control variables  could be  2,0  oo.
used  to develop relationships  between  combi- 
nations  of  policy  variables  (support  prices,  ooo 
marketing quotas,  and program budgets)  and 
the resulting target value  for either producer  , 
income,  edible  peanut  consumer  surplus,  or  ,0o  "
nonedible peanut consumer surplus.  - -
'  I100  "  "  0  o0  ~  2-0-300
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FIGURE 1.  TRADEOFFS  AMONG  POLI- Isobudget  lines  showing  the  combinations  CY  CONTROLLED  VARI-
of  marketing  quotas  and  support  prices  that  ABLES  WITH  A  PEANUT
could  have been financed  with a given budget  SUPPORT  PRICE  ACREAGE
are shown in Figure 1. Isonet farm income lines  CONTROL  PROGRAM
101income and program cost associated with alter-  tion  is  not  possible  and  all  farm  income  in-
native support  prices  and a  given  marketing  creases  must  come  directly  from  program
quota. The intersection of any set of horizontal  expenditures.
and vertical lines will define the estimated gov-
ernment cost and resulting net farm income for  Consumer Surplus Tradeoffs
the represented price support and quota level.
Figure  1 shows that the support prices  and  Changing  the  support  price  or  marketing
marketing quotas set under the past and forth-  quota  will  alter  consumer  surpluses  in  the
coming  peanut  program  achieved  their  asso-  edible  and/or  nonedible  markets  for  peanuts.
ciated  farm  income  levels  at  a  much  larger  Figure 2 depicts and quantifies the magnitudes
budgetary  cost than is estimated to be neces-
sary.  For  example,  in  1975  the  minimum  "Marksti2  Q,.'
acreage allotment  of 1.6 million acres resulted  \\\\
in  the production  of  3,747  million pounds  of  \\\\\'  i  ' 
peanuts.  The  support  price  was  set  at  19.7
cents  or  75  percent  of  parity.  This  level  pro-  30  \\- 
duced a net farm income of $393.5 million.  By  ':i
moving  downward  to the  right  on  an  imagi-  2,5O  -,poo
nary  isonet  income  line just  below  the  $400 
million  isonet  income  line,  one  sees  that  the  . 8o,
same  income  can  be  provided  with  a  much  Ioonwpl,)
smaller budget if support prices are raised and  I  o  --  T.
marketing quotas reduced.  1,o000o  n-Edibl  C.  "(XJ  U
Peanut  program  costs  to  the  government
under  the  past  peanut  program  consist  of  -o  ,'  2'0  5  35  g.o  s  o  5'5
bearing the losses and expenses  of purchasing  Sp  Priclb
the quantity of  peanuts  required  to maintain  FIGURE 2.  CONSUMER  SURPLUS
the  support  price  and  then  reselling  these  TRADEOFFS  WITH  A  PEA-
peanuts  in the  nonedible  peanut market  at a  NUT  PRICE  ACREAGE  CON-
lower  price.  Total  program  costs  under  this  TROL PROGRAM
system  and  other  systems  which  conduct
market  discrimination  activities  are  likely  to
be  less  than  total  increases  in  farm  income  and directions  of change  for  edible  consumer
generated  by  the  program.  This  relationship  surplus,  nonedible  consumer  surplus,5 and
between  program  costs  and  farm  income  in-  total  peanut  consumer  surplus  in relation  to
creases exists  because  part of the increase  in  support  price  and  quota  levels.  Though  the
farm income  generated  by such a  program  is  direction  of  change  of consumer  surpluses  in
obtained  through  the  market  by  increasing  each market resulting from changing the quota
prices  in  the  inelastic  edible  peanut  market.  or  support  price can be deduced  from market
Estimates  obtained  with  the  peanut  model  discrimination  theory,  the relative magnitude
indicate  that between  1970  and  1975,  on the  of change and direction of change for total con-
average,  41  percent  of  the  increase  in  farm  sumer surplus can be determined only by appli-
income (in relation to an open market with the  cation  of  an  empirical  model  of  the  peanut
same  level  of  production)  was  generated  market.  Figure  2 was developed  by obtaining
through market discrimination.  The remaining  optimal control solutions to the peanut  model.
59 percent was generated by government  pur-  The  procedure  used to obtain  these  solutions
chases  of peanuts  at the  established  support  was similar to that used in developing Figure
price.  The  magnitude  of  income  increases  1, i.e., by constraining consumer surpluses to a
achieved from the market depends on the elas-  given value and repeatedly  solving the model
ticity of edible peanut demand and the amount  at  various  support  prices,  an  "isoconsumer
of market discrimination  conducted. 4 Under  a  surplus  line"  is mapped.  (Figure 2  can be sup-
target price program, market price discrimina-  erimposed on Figure 1 if desired.)
4The potential magnitude of income increases  that can be achieved with a given budget increase are shown and quantified in Figure  1. Starting from a support
price of approximately 17 cents per pound and a production level slightly above 2,500 million pounds, an increase of support prices of approximately 6 cents to a level
of 24 cents increases net farm income by nearly $150 million at an added budgetary cost  of only $40  million; hence, the ratio of increased income to increased budget
cost is 3.75 to 1 in this instance. (The "A income/A  budget" ratio decreases as one moves the initial point of comparison to the extreme  lower right corner of the figure
or extreme upper left  corner.) Note that moving directly  upward from the initial point specified  results in equal increases in  budget expenses and  income  because
market discrimination and the market income effect associated with it can be obtained only by raising support prices.
'No  distinction is made between domestic and foreign purchases  of peanuts for nonedible  use. Policy  alternatives  which discriminate  against  foreign buyers
could be studied but are not considered  here.
102In  Figure 2,  edible  consumer surplus  (if the  all groups  are considered,  any change from an
quota  is  adequate  to  meet  the  demand  at  a  existing support price and/or marketing quota
given support price) is affected only by the sup-  will result in at least one group being harmed.
port price  and has an inverse  relation  to sup-  Many  changes  from  past  support  price,
port  price.  Nonedible  consumer  surplus  is  marketing  quota,  and  program  budget  levels
related positively to both the support price and  can  be  analyzed  from  Figures  1 and 2  and/or
the marketing quota.  The total consumer  sur-  the optimal control  framework  used to  derive
plus  tradeoff  pattern  is  dominated  by  the  them. One set of changes worthy of being con-
edible  consumer  surplus  relationships,  i.e.,  sidered  are those which will be brought about
total consumer  surplus  is related inversely to  by the new peanut program.
support  price  and  has  only  a  slight  positive  The  new peanut  program  specifies  that the
relation to the quota level.  support  price  will  be  maintained  at  approxi-
Edible  and  nonedible  consumer  isosurplus  mately  21  cents  per  pound  while  marketing
curves  are  distinctly  different  because  of the  quotas  are  reduced  over  a  three-year  period
different  elasticities  of  demand  for  each  starting  with  the  1978  crop year  from  3,360
market and because  of the presence  of market  million  pounds  to  2,880  million  pounds.  As-
discrimination.  As an illustration,  consider the  suming  no  "additional  peanuts"  (peanuts  in
following  case.  At a production  level of 3,441  excess  of  the  marketing  quota  which  can  be
million pounds and a support price of 14 cents,  sold at a lower support price) are produced and
edible  consumption  is  2,096  million  pounds,  barring  significant  changes  in  market  condi-
nonedible  consumption  is  1,065  million  tions, this support price and marketing quota
pounds,  and  miscellaneous  consumption  schedule  specified  in the new  program  would
amounts  to  280  million  pounds.  If  the  same  reduce  gross  revenue  from  peanut  sales  by
marketing  quota  is  maintained  and  support  1981  to $604.8  million or $133.4  million below
price is  raised to 15 cents,  edible consumption  the  1975  gross  revenue  level.  Budget  costs
will  fall  by  33  million  pounds  and  nonedible  would  be  reduced  from  the  estimated  1975
consumption  will  increase  by  33  million  level  of  $122.5  million  to  approximately  $90
pounds.  This  change  causes a  decline  in non-  million. Edible peanut consumer surplus would
edible  peanut  prices  of  approximately  one  be  reduced  slightly and nonedible peanut con-
tenth of a cent. The decline  is small because  of  sumer surplus would  fall by nearly 40 percent.
the elastic nature of nonedible peanut demand.  The  preceding figures  fall short of being  fore-
The associated  consumer surplus changes  are:  casts because  changing market conditions and
a decline of edible consumer  surplus  of $2,808  the  possibility  of  "additional  peanuts"  being
thousand,  i.e.,  approximately  one times 2,096;  produced are not considered.
an  increase  of  nonedible  surplus  of  $108  The impact of "additional peanuts"  produc-
thousand,  i.e.,  approximately  .1 times  1,065;  tion could be analyzed specifically if the magni-
and  a  decline  in  total  consumer  surplus  of  tude of additional peanut production under the
$1,988 thousand,  i.e., 2,096  minus 108. Hence,  new program could be predicted. The 1978 sup-
edible  consumer  surplus  and  total  consumer  port price for additional  peanuts of 12.5  cents
surplus  are  more  sensitive  to  support  price  per  pound  is  barely  adequate  to  cover  the
than  nonedible  consumer  surplus.  A  similar  direct cost of peanut production in most loca-
line  of reasoning  could  be  developed  to  show  tions  [10];  hence,  the production of additional
that nonedible consumer surplus is more sensi-  peanuts  may  be  limited.  To  the  extent  that
tive to marketing quotas than edible consumer  additional  peanuts  are  produced,  they  would
surplus.  increase  nonedible consumer surplus and gross
IMPLICATIONS  farm  revenue from  peanut sales.  Also,  to the
extent  that  government  support  prices  for
Figures  I  and  2  indicate  conflicts  among  additional  peanuts are above the market price
peanut  producers,  edible  peanut  consumers,  for peanuts, expenses would be incurred by the
nonedible peanut consumers,  and taxpayers.  If  government  on additional peanuts purchased.
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